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When the battle comes in earnest...you will find an element of great weakness in
our non-slaveholding population. Think you that 360,000 slaveholders, will dic-
tate terms for 3,000,000 of non-slaveholders at the South–I fear not, I mistrust
our own people more than I fear all of the eﬀorts of the abolitionists.
Daniel H. Hamilton, US Marshal for Charleston, S.C, in private correspondence to
Congressman William Porcher Miles, February 2, 1860 (Miles Letters, LC).
1 Introduction
Recent research on American politics has emphasized the influence of wealth and income
disparities over public policy. A variety of mechanisms, including campaign contributions,
lobbying, and unequal participation, among others, have been proposed to explain the
influence of wealthier voters in the political process.1 Less attention, however, has been
paid to the way in which long-term biases in representation favor economic elites at the
expense of less wealthy voters.
In this paper, we investigate this form of elite influence during perhaps the most con-
sequential domestic crisis in U.S. history, the Southern secession movement of 1860-61.
The consensus is that this movement was driven by slaveholders due to their fears over
the future of slavery in the Union (see e.g., Freehling 2007; McPherson 1988; Potter 1976;
Stampp 1980). This explanation has raised an enduring puzzle over why this movement was
electorally successful. Although slaves represented a sizable share of all Southern wealth,2
they were concentrated in the hands of a small minority (according to the 1860 Census,
only 10% of adult white males owned approximately 90% of the slaves). Moreover, it has
been shown that non-slaveholders, especially those living in the low slave-dependent re-
gions, largely opposed secession.3 The disproportionate influence of slaveholders during
the crisis is emphasized by Key (1984, 6) who argued in his canonical study of Southern
1See Bonica et al. (2013) for a review of these mechanisms.
2By 1860, the capital invested in slaves was roughly equal to the value of all farmland
and farm buildings in the South. Furthermore, slaves accounted for more than half the
agricultural labor force in the seceding states (Ransom 2001).
3Although some historians have argued that secession was supported by a broad coali-
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politics that the “Impressive–and unfortunate–political victory of the large slaveholders
came in their success, despite their small numbers, in carrying their states for war.” How
did the slaveholding elite achieve such a radical measure within a democratic framework?
We answer this question by examining the method by which secession was chosen and
the electoral rules that facilitated its success. In ten of the eleven states that formed the
Confederate States of America, the decision to secede was made in specially convened con-
ventions. Our argument is that although the delegates to these conventions were popularly
elected, the system of representation crucially favored slaveholders. Specifically, delegates
were elected from single and multi-member districts by plurality voting, a system that is
prone to produce distortions when voters are unevenly distributed across space (Erickson
1974; Rodden and Chen 2013). Given the economic geography of slavery, slaveholders were
concentrated in slave-intensive counties, where they could obtain local pluralities in favor
of secession more easily. Similarly, large “uphill” regions contained relatively few slaves
and a substantial share of the non-slaveholding voters. While most opposed secession, the
use of winner-take-all districts meant that their surplus votes did not translate into greater
representation. In addition, the apportionment employed overrepresented slave-intensive
districts, particularly in the Lower South states leading the movement. These factors, which
are largely unexplored in the literature, explain in part the electoral success of secessionists.
We use various pieces of evidence to substantiate this argument. First, we derive a new
measure of representation using the legislation that stipulated the apportionment of seats in
each convention. This measure shows how counties with more slaves per voter, slaveholders
per white men, and planters per slaveholder, were all systematically overrepresented. We
also show that in all of the seceding states, a majority of non-slaveholders were concentrated
in counties electing a minority of representatives. Using the existing returns on the election
of delegates, we then investigate how the electoral districts used influenced the behavior of
tion, which included even those who had no direct stake in slavery (e.g., Huston 2003;
McPherson 1988; Stampp 1980), studies exploring the available evidence in various states
refute this thesis and confirm the substantial opposition secessionists faced, mostly from
the yeoman of the low-slave incidence regions (see e.g., Crofts 1993; Johnson 1977; Key
1984; Lipset 1960).
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voters. Specifically, we show that slave-intensive districts, which were much more likely to
elect secessionist candidates, were significantly less competitive and associated with high
rates of abstention.
In sum, these factors imply that the use of conventions reduced the share of the elec-
torate whose support was necessary to achieve secession. In the Lower South states for
which we have information, the eﬀective number of votes from the slave-intensive districts–
which elected more than 50% of the delegates to each convention–represented only 7% of
the adult white male population in these states.
We consider a number of alternative mechanisms which could explain the success of
the movement. Importantly, it is possible that while non-slaveholders largely voted for
candidates opposing secession, their representatives changed their position once elected
(Williams, Williams, and Carlson, 2002). This is plausible given that voters did not possess
the typical mechanism for holding representatives accountable; these were one-oﬀ elections
without the possibility of reelection. We explore this possibility using an original dataset
of roll-call votes in seven diﬀerent conventions and find that delegates were highly respon-
sive to the slaveholding interests of their constituents. Specifically, we find a strong and
positive relationship between the slave labor incidence of constituencies and the likelihood
of representatives voting for pro-secession motions. Hence, non-slaveholding constituencies
were eﬀectively represented during the crisis.
Another concern is that the (de jure) electoral advantages of slave districts could sim-
ply reflect the de facto power of slaveholders and their control over state institutions. We
thus study empirically the origins of the electoral system used in the conventions, which
mirrored the one of each corresponding legislature. We document how the legislative over-
representation of slave-intensive counties can be traced back to the early 19th century and
for the original states even to the late 18th century. Moreover, this basis of representa-
tion was enshrined in each of the Southern states’ initial constitutions. Thus, the political
inequalities we emphasize were historically associated with the political-economy conflict
within states between slaveholders and non-slaveholders and plausibly independent of any
preexisting ideology or preference for Southern independence.
The use of conventions was of course endogenous to the politics of each state and in
particular to the legislative power of large slaveholders. If the leaders of the movement had
the power to pass and implement these special conventions, why did they not vote on inde-
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pendence directly in their respective legislatures? We argue that the conventions brought
an additional benefit to the movement, and this explains why they were preferred. Namely
by using conventions, secessionists hoped to legitimize a highly contentious and radical
decision without the uncertainty associated with a referendum. We place this strategy in
the context of a distinctive tradition in the South of making constitutional changes without
a subsequent popular ratification (Freehling 2007). Accordingly, six of the seven pre-War
conventions passed ordinances that were never subject to popular ratification. Thus by
following the “best of precedents,” and proceeding in a “constitutional manner” (Rhodes
1892, 272), secessionists tried to legitimize their cause using an existing norm. We show
that the public debates at the time are consistent with this argument.
In addition to contributing to our understanding of this critical episode in American
history, our argument and evidence are relevant to various other literatures. While there
is an extensive literature on how distortions to representation influence the allocation of
public resources and fiscal outcomes (e.g., Ansolabehere, Gerber and Snyder 2002; Ardanaz
and Scartascini 2013; Dragu and Rodden 2011), or the relationship between partisan votes
and seats (e.g., Chen and Rodden 2013), to our knowledge no previous work has analyzed
its relationship with secession or with conflict more generally. We expand thus the scope
of these literatures showing that this form of political inequality can play a consequential
role in macro political outcomes. We also contribute to works on how elites exploit insti-
tutional biases in democracy. Most of these studies focus on how multiple pivots can limit
redistribution and preserve other unpopular status quo policies (e.g., Kriehbiel 1998; Mc-
Carty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006). Yet, the secession movement required Southern elites to
radically alter the status quo. Our empirical evidence also contributes to a large literature
trying to identify the importance of constituents on legislative voting behavior (e.g., Poole
and Rosenthal 2011), and to a smaller set of studies exploring the link between “structural”
factors and the individual decisions of politicians (e.g., Ziblatt 2008). Lastly, our case has
important implications for the political economy literature on secession (e.g., Alesina and
Spolaore 1997; Bolton and Roland 1997). While these models admit the possibility of a
majority supporting an ineﬃcient political fragmentation, they do not account for a similar
minority-led process.4 Hence our case implies that distortions of representation can greatly
4These models do emphasize that the net benefits of secession are distributed unevenly.
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influence the welfare implications of these models.
2 Historical Background
While tensions between states over slavery had long existed, Whigs and Democrats com-
peted across all regions and the issue of slavery was largely suppressed from the national
debate during most of the Second Party System (1828-1854).5 This system broke down in
the 1850s when disagreement over the spread of slavery led the Whig Party to split (Holt
1992). Soon after the Whigs’ demise, the Republican Party, whose primary platform was to
ban the spread of slavery into the Western territories, emerged solely in the free states. Due
to the much larger population of the Northern states, the Republican presidential nomi-
nee, Abraham Lincoln, was able to win a majority of electoral votes as a solely sectional
candidate on November 6, 1860.
Soon after Lincoln’s election, most slave states convened special sessions of their legis-
latures to discuss their response to the new administration. By mid-December, six Lower
South states separately passed legislation calling for a “convention of the people,” a special
unicameral legislative body convened specifically to consider their position in the Union. In
addition to specifying the apportionment of delegates to these conventions, each legislature
empowered these delegations with the ability to decide any measure necessary to protect
the state’s interests.6
In the short timespan between the passing of this legislation and the elections for dele-
gates, two factions emerged. “Immediate secessionists” (hereafter, secessionists) advocated
Yet the decision to secede is taken by a median voter or by a representative regional citizen.
Consequently, issues of preference aggregation are not crucial in the analysis.
5The crisis began in earnest with the Wilmot Proviso (1846), a failed bill that called for
the prohibition of slavery in new territories. Soonafter, California was admitted alone as a
free state. This disrupted the federal-level commitment in the Senate to sectional equality
between free and slave states (Weingast 1998).
6Elster (1995) classifies this type of convention as one in which the legislature places no
“upstream constraints” on its scope or power.
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for their state to unilaterally secede. A separate faction, which became known as “Coop-
erationists,” was a coalition of unionists, moderates, and pro-slavery supporters who, at
a bare minimum, opposed unilateral secession. Their primary platform was that South-
ern grievances with the free states should be addressed as a bloc, which would lower the
chances of a costly conflict and strengthen their bargaining position (Crofts 1989; Potter
1976). Cooperationists also asserted that any decision by a convention would only take
eﬀect if voters ratified it via referendum (Freehling 2007, 464; Barney 1974, 198).7
Private correspondences between secessionist leaders reveal that they harbored serious
doubts about the popularity of their movement and thus opposed a secession referendum.
This is candidly explained by Alfred Aldrich, member of the South Carolina (hereafter,
SC) legislature in a letter to one of the state’s US Senators, James H. Hammond, about
the strategy secessionist should follow: “I do not want to see another attempt to vote a
revolution. The thing is absurd & can’t be done...If the question must be referred back to
the people...it will be an utter failure.” A month later he reiterated his concerns about a
referendum: “I do not believe the common people understand it, in fact, I know they will
not understand it; But whoever waited for the common people when a great move was to
be made?” (Hammond Papers, LC)
Alternative mechanisms, such as holding a collective Southern convention, were also
seen as harming the prospects of the movement. Anticipating that a Southern majority
would oppose secession, William Gist, the secessionist governor of SC, wrote on the 8th
of November, 1860, to Mississippi’s governor “do not ask for a Southern Council, as the
Border & non-acting States would out vote us & thereby defeat action. Let your State
immediately assemble in Convention” (as cited in Freehling 2007, 446).
The creation of a convention and the later unilateral declaration of independence, was
the route followed by the first states to secede. For instance, the SC legislature voted on
November 13, 1860 to hold elections for delegates on December 6 to a convention that would
convene on December 17. This convention voted unanimously to secede from the Union
on December 20. By the end of January, 1861, five more Lower South states (Florida-FL,
7According to Potter (1976, 495), cooperationists “set, as a prerequisite to secession,
such a high degree of unanimity that they seemed unwilling to secede at all...(therefore)
secessionists regarded Cooperationists as Unionists.”
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Alabama-AL, Mississippi-MS, Georgia-GA and Louisiana-LA) had declared their indepen-
dence following the same mechanism. These states later formed the Confederate States of
America in early February of 1861. Soon after Texas (TX), the last Lower South state,
approved a similar ordinance in a convention and joined the Confederacy in March of 1861.8
The path of the Upper South states to joining the Confederacy was crucially diﬀerent.
In particular, voters in each state were given the opportunity via referendum to either
determine whether to hold conventions at all, or subject any secession resolution to a
posterior ratification. For example, in North Carolina (NC) and Tennessee (TN) voters
rejected the holding of a convention, initially defeating the movement in these states. This
rejection was anticipated by a secessionist leader in NC in a letter to one of the state’s
Congressmen by saying “You cannot unite the masses of any Southern state much less
those of N.C. against the Union & in favor [of] slavery alone” (as cited in Crofts, 1989,
132). In this case, holding such a referendum was a compromise reached when secessionists
could not obtain the supermajority required by the state’s constitution to call a convention.
This was seen as a defeat by those who hoped to rush the state “out of the Union without
giving the people an opportunity to determine their fate” (Harris 1988, 37).
In Virginia (VA), the legislature called for a convention but also held a referendum
on whether a convention’s decision would require popular ratification. The inclusion of
this provision caused a “heated debate” in the legislature (Wooster 1962, 141). Voters
later approved the proposed posterior ratification by a wide margin. Although Missouri
(MO) remained in the Union, the process was similar. According to Wooster (1962, 225),
“as originally proposed, the convention bill would have provided for a convention with
unlimited power, but (anti-secessionist)...were able to secure adoption of an amendment
8The process in TX was somewhat diﬀerent. First, pro-Union Governor, Sam Houston,
refused to call a special session of the legislature, the convening of which was necessary to
create a convention. As a result, secessionists privately called for an extralegal convention.
Questioning the legitimacy of this decision, unionists “failed to put forward a slate of
candidates in the county elections of convention delegates” (Buenger 1983, 299). Hence, a
sizeable share of the counties did not hold elections, at all, and roughly 25% percent of the
counties did not send delegates to the convention (Wooster 1962).
8
providing that any action changing the relationship of Missouri to the Union would not be
valid until approved by the state’s voters.” A convention in Arkansas (AR) voted against
secession making such ratification unnecessary.
The federal government did not recognize the states’ right to secede, and refused to
surrender all federal property in the seceded states. Conflict began on April 12, 1861, with
the firing on Fort Sumter in Charleston (SC), and Lincoln’s subsequent call on April 15
for troops to suppress the movement. This altered significantly the costs and benefits of
secession since avoiding war was no longer a possibility. Thus, in these states the choice
of whether to secede or not after April 15, 1861, was then more about which side of the
war voters and representatives preferred their state to fight for.9 In the weeks following
Lincoln’s call, AR, NC, and VA, seceded using similar mechanisms as in the Lower South.
VA and AR passed secession ordinances in their previously convened conventions on April
17 and May 6, respectively. The NC General Assembly called for an autonomous convention
to be held; it unanimously chose to secede on May 20.10
3 The Political Advantage of Slave Owners
In this section, we analyze how the system of representation used in the conventions fa-
vored slaveholding constituencies. We provide evidence of two sources of distortion. First,
the apportionment of delegates systematically over-represented districts with a high con-
centration of slaves. We demonstrate this using an original dataset of delegates and their
corresponding constituency in each state holding a convention. Second, despite being a
majority, the economic geography of slavery meant that many non-slaveholders tended to
9This change in the context is vividly expressed in a speech to the VA Convention
by delegate, James Dorman on April 17. Despite voting against secession on April 4,
Dorman said “The issue is now upon us; we must fight; and the question is, which side will
we take...That side is the South” (Proceedings of the Virginia State Convention of 1861,
4:119).
10TN was the only Confederate state in which the state General Assembly passed a direct
statue on secession.
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be located in electoral districts with few slaves. These districts, where non-slaveholders
significantly outnumbered slaveholders, only elected a minority of delegates. In contrast,
slaveholders were more eﬃciently distributed across the high slave counties which comprised
a majority of delegates. These factors explain why secessionists in each state believed that
a sovereign convention would enhance the chances of their movement.
3.1 Political Inequality in the Conventions
An important source of distortion in the representation of slave interests originated in
the apportionment of the conventions. We demonstrate this using a measure of local
representation based on the number of delegates each district elected. This information
was coded from the individual pieces of legislation passed in late 1860 and early 1861
stipulating the apportionment of each convention. In all cases, the basis of representation
was based on the apportionment of each corresponding legislature.11 We focus on the
founding members of the Confederacy (AL, FL, GA, LA, MS, and SC), whose choice to
secede precipitated the conflict.
Following Ansolabehere, Gerber and Snyder (2002), we use a measure of representation
which is relative to the “fair” level of each particular state (which they call the Relative
Representation Index-). Formally, this measure is:
 = ()()  (1)
where the subscript () indicates that district  is located in state .  is the number
of delegates and  denotes the voting population. This index creates a common metric
across conventions by normalizing the representation of each locality by the voting power
specific to each state. Individuals in districts with an index of less (more) than 1 were under-
represented (over-represented) in their convention. An index value close to one corresponds
to a level of representation consistent with the “one person, one vote” principle. We take
11For instance, representation in the FL, GA, LA, and SC conventions equaled the com-
bined number of representatives and senators apportioned to each county in the state
legislature. In AL and MS apportionment was equal to the number of representatives in
each state’s lower house.
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the log to reduce the weight of outliers and the right skew of this variable and use the adult
white male (hereafter AWM) population as a proxy for the number of eligible voters.
In Figure 1 we present two regression models predicting this index based on the level
of local slave prevalence. Each model controls for factors that are usually associated with
legislative malapportionment and potentially correlated with slave intensity. Namely, we
include a set of demographic factors such as the total population, the level of urbanization,
and the population density (given the 1860 county size in sq. km.). We control as well for
the share of the district’s white population who were foreign born which could influence the
size of the electorate. These demographics are taken from the 1860 Census and the county
size was calculated using the Atlas of Historical County Boundaries (Newberry Library,
Chicago). In all models we also include state fixed-eﬀects; therefore all coeﬃcients have a
within-state interpretation.
We begin taking the slave population, as a proportion of total district population,
as the main predictor of representation in the conventions.12 This variable captures in
a simple way the importance of slavery for the district-level economy. The left panel
presents a partial-regression leverage plot with the predicted  on the y-axis against the
predicted 1860 slave share on the x-axis. Each marker corresponds to a single district in the
corresponding state. The estimated slope of 1.34 (S.E.=0.09) indicates that each percentage
point increase in a district’s slave prevalence was associated with a greater than 1% increase
in the district’s relative representation index. This implies that a district having 65% of
its population enslaved (i.e., one standard deviation above the sample mean), is predicted
to have a  0.28 log points above that of the average district.13 In terms of over-
representation, the magnitude of this diﬀerence is substantial–such district is predicted to
have a representation per voter that is more than twice the “fair” level in the particular
state. Conversely, a district with a slave share of 21% (one standard deviation below the
mean slave share), is highly underrepresented with a predicted  of just 0.65. The
corresponding regression estimates are reported in the Appendix, Table A1.
In panel B, we use the number of slaveholders as a proportion of the AWM population.
12For multi-county districts we calculated weighted averages based on total population.
13This diﬀerence represents more than 60% of the standard deviation of the empirical
distribution of the (log)  in the sample.
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Figure 1: Convention Representation and Slavery’s Prevalence
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(slaves/population), (B) slaveholders share (slaveholders/AWM); both
calculated using the 1860 Census. Each dot represents a single dis-
trict. All models partial out the eﬀect of (log) population, urban rate,
share of foreign born, and population density (total population /dis-
trict area).
As opposed to slave share which captures the importance of slavery for the local economy,
this measure captures the breadth of slaveownership among the electorate. The estimated
slope is again positive and highly significant. The point estimate of 1.59 (S.E.=0.14) implies
that a district where half of its voters are slaveholders will have a predicted  score of
2.26, which is almost twice the relative representation score of the mean district in the
sample (where slaveholders comprised roughly one third of the electorate). The diﬀerence
in magnitude with a district one standard deviation below, where slaveholders represented
only 17% of the voters, is more than 3-fold.
In our Online Appendix we explore the robustness of these results (Tables OA2-3 and
Figures OA1-2). First, we perform a sensitivity analysis excluding outliers and taking
each convention separately. We find that the positive association between slave prevalence
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and over-representation is almost identical when outliers are removed and consistent across
states. Second, we expand our list of controls and include other economic characteristics
of constituencies (e.g., size of the manufacturing sector). Importantly, we control for local
economic inequality using a measure of land inequality. All our estimates are robust to the
inclusion of these additional controls. Lastly, we use alternative measures for the prevalence
of slave labor, in particular for the incidence of large slaveholdings. We use the 1860 Census
Slave Schedule to estimate the number of planters per AWM and the average slaveholding
across districts.14 These measures are consistent with our main findings.
3.2 The Political Geography of Slavery
It is well known that in majoritarian systems the degree to which representation reflects the
preferences of the electorate depends on the distribution of voters across districts (e.g., Cox
and Katz 2002; Chen and Rodden 2013; Erickson 1974). If voters with similar preferences
are concentrated, then the surplus supporters above the plurality threshold do not result
in greater legislative representation.15 Similarly, these systems will benefit minority groups
or small parties if their supporters are more concentrated than their ratio for the polity as
a whole (Calvo and Rodden 2015). This was particularly relevant to an election dividing
the electorate across slave ownership lines as natural endowments strongly conditioned
the location of large-scale slavery.16 This spatial concentration of slave labor meant that
slaveholders were eﬃciently distributed such that they could fabricate pluralities in enough
districts to constitute a majority of representatives. In addition, large swaths of the South
contained many districts with few slaves and where most voters were non-slaveholders. This
14We follow the norm in the literature and define planters as slaveholders owning 20 or
more slaves (e.g., Kolchin 1993).
15For example, scholars argue that Democrats in the US are ineﬃciently concentrated in
urban areas, leading to fewer representatives than their share among the electorate (e.g.,
Chen and Rodden 2013).
16For instance, studies have shown that slave prevalence in 1860 is highly correlated with
soil suitability to cotton and climate suitability to the transmission of malaria parasites
(e.g., Bertocchi and Dimico 2014).
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“unintentional gerrymandering” resulted in a powerful electoral advantage for slaveholders.
[Table 1 about here]
In Table 1 we illustrate this bias in the election of convention delegates. Column (1)
first reports the average non-slaveholder-to-slaveholder ratio for each of the original six
Confederate states.17 Although slaves constituted nearly 50% of the total population in
these states, there were on average 2.3 non-slaveholding AWM for every one slaveholder. To
show the ineﬃcient concentration of non-slaveholders we sort counties from lowest to highest
slave share and create two groups, each containing half of the non-slaveholding AWM.
The ineﬃcient spatial distribution of non-slaveholders is evident. In the low slave share
districts (column 2), there were approximately 5.1 non-slaveholders for every slaveholder.
Yet, these districts only elected on average 33% of the convention delegates. Column (3)
shows that in the remaining counties there were on average only 1.4 non-slaveholders for
every slaveholder. This occurs because slaveholders were eﬃciently concentrated in these
districts. As reported in column (4), nearly 80% of the slaveholding population lived in
these highest slave-share counties. The electoral advantage of this is shown in Column
5, as these most enslaved counties selected on average two-thirds of the delegates in each
state’s convention. This uneven distribution of slave ownership was particularly pronounced
in the three Lower South states with the greatest AWM populations (AL, GA and LA).
Half of each state’s non-slaveholders lived in counties in which there were more than 5
non-slaveholders for every slaveholder.
3.3 A Biased System of Representation
Finally, in columns (6) and (7) we combine the spatial distribution of slave ownership
with the apportionment of each convention to summarize the electoral advantage of high
slave-dependent districts. We first construct a set of “minimal winning districts,” which is
17We calculate the number of non-slaveholders by subtracting the slaveholders from the
AWM population of each county. While rare, there were instances of non-AWM who were
slaveholders (e.g., widows and free blacks). Yet, the Census data does not allow us to
diﬀerentiate them.
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defined as a subset of the most enslaved districts electing a simple majority of delegates.
As shown in column (6), nearly half of the electorate of these districts were slaveholders
(in SC, the first state to secede, the number of non-slaveholders is exactly the same as the
number of slaveholders). While these districts contained only 41% of the AWM population
of these states (column 7), they had 64% of its slaveholders and 78% of its planters (and
75% of its slaves). Hence, it is not surprising that these localities overwhelmingly elected
secessionist candidates. Indeed, as we show below, nearly 90% of the delegates from these
counties voted for secession in their convention. Since secessionists only needed a plurality
in these minimal winning districts, the electorate eﬀectively deciding on secession was very
small. That is, due to the electoral system, the choice to rupture the Union with all of its
foreseeable consequences was eﬀectively made by a plurality of voters in an area containing
16% of the eventual Confederacy’s electorate.
4 Conventions and Popular Support
We now use the election results for convention candidates to investigate how the electoral
system in each state eﬀectively lowered the level of support necessary to obtain an elected
majority in favor of secession. In the Lower South states for which there are records, seces-
sionist candidates received approximately 49% of the popular vote in GA (Johnson 1977),
52% in LA (Dew 1970), 56% in AL (Denman 1933), and 57% in MS (Rainwater 1938).18
Based on these figures, historians have argued that while the Lower South electorate was
divided, a majority in each state supported the movement (e.g., Barney 1974; Stampp 1980;
McPherson 1988; Fogel 1994).
In this section, we show that these vote aggregates are not an accurate measure of the
underlying support for secession as the use of plurality districts influenced the participation
of voters. First, we document the steep decline in turnout in these elections. We charac-
terize this decline by the low level of electoral competitiveness of many districts and argue
18In the Upper South states having similar (pre-War) elections, the existing records
reveal that secessionists were clearly a minority. In NC, secessionists candidates obtained
approximately 40% of the popular vote (Kruman 1983) while in TN they received only 22%
(Crofts 1989).
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that this is partly explained by the electoral system used in each state. Specifically, voters
residing in districts expected to be uncompetitive, such as those in high slave-dependent
districts voting in favor of secession, had a lower incentive to turnout compared to a state
referendum in which all votes are counted equally towards an aggregate state tally. In addi-
tion, opposing candidates were less likely to enter races in districts in which there was little
chance of winning. We show that these mechanisms negatively aﬀected turnout, but were a
more important influence in the high slave-dependent counties won mostly by secessionists.
4.1 Turnout
Historians have long noted that turnout in the elections for convention delegates was very
low, particularly in the Lower South (e.g., Johnson 1977; Barney 1974; Freehling 2007).
We illustrate this by taking the 1860 presidential election turnout as a benchmark, which
provides a lower bound for the number of eligible voters in each district. This election
occurred less than two months prior to all the elections for delegates and provides a plausible
counterfactual for the potential participation under a statewide referendum.19 Relatively
complete and quantifiable district-level returns exist for four Lower South states: AL, GA,
LA, and MS (returns are missing for only 2% of the delegates).
Figure 2 shows the average district-level support for secessionist and cooperationist
candidates, respectively, as a share of 1860 presidential turnout.20 As shown in the third bar
(left panel), on average a fourth of those who voted in the 1860 presidential election failed to
turnout in the election of delegates. We further disaggregate counties won by secessionist
and cooperationist candidates, respectively. In the secessionist counties (middle panel),
which combined elected 55% of the delegates, more than a third of the voters who turned
out in the presidential election abstained in the respective convention election. This is
19Because of the electoral college, and the rules adopted by each state, presidential
elections are akin to a referendum to determine which candidate is to be awarded the
state’s electoral votes.
20In a few districts the presidential vote is not available so we use the turnout of the most
recent gubernatorial race. For wards of New Orleans, we use the qualified voters registered
in 1858. See Data Appendix for a detailed explanation and sources.
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Figure 2: Voter Participation Election of Delegates
Notes: Each bar represents the average district-level vote, as a share
of 1860 presidential turnout, in the elections for convention delegates
in AL, GA, LA and MS. ”Sec” and ”Coop” is the vote received by
secessionist, and cooperationist candidates, respectively. ”Abst” is
the average abstention (benchmark is the 1860 presidential turnout).
Middle panel takes the sample of districts in which the highest vote
was obtained by a secessionist candidate. Right panel are districts in
which a cooperationist candidate received the highest vote.
more than twice the average abstention in counties won by cooperationist candidates (right
panel).21 The result of this steep decline in participation is that the majorities in these
conventions were elected by 28% of the votes cast in the preceding presidential election and
by only 21% of the AWM population in these states.
4.2 Local Competitiveness
While many causes have been oﬀered for the decline in turnout, such as poor weather (John-
son 1977), voter intimidation (Williams 2008), resignation that secession was inevitable
(Barney 1974), and collective action problems inherent to the heterogeneous cooperationist
21The p-value of the diﬀerence in means is less than 0.0001.
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coalition (Freehling 2007; Johnson 1977), none has been able to account for the variation
observed within states. For instance, approximately 10% of counties in these four states
experienced a decline in turnout of more than 50%. Yet, 10% also witnessed an increase in
turnout.
Theoretically, district demographics could partially explain this variation in partic-
ipation. As is well known, the use of plurality voting to select representatives out of
geographic districts is associated with low turnout (e.g., Jackman 1987), particularly in
non-competitive districts (Eggers 2015).22 This is very relevant given the high spatial con-
centration of slaves. Namely, in districts having a high share of slaves the likelihood of
electing a secessionist candidate was high. Similarly, the likelihood of electing a coopera-
tionist representative was high in the low-slave-share districts. This implies that many of
these local races were unlikely to be competitive. The electoral returns bear out this eﬀect.
The average margin of victory was 44%, and in only 15% of counties in these states was
the election decided by 10 percentage points or less.23
In Figure 3 we provide systematic evidence of the positive association between local
competitiveness and the participation in these elections. Again, we take the 1860 presiden-
tial election turnout as a benchmark. The left panel (A) presents a partial regression plot
with the predicted change in turnout between these elections in the y-axis and a predicted
measure of district competitiveness in the x-axis.24 By measuring the change within each
22The standard argument is that non-competitive districts are perceived as “safe seats”
where the election outcome locally is highly predictable. This discourages participation
given some non-negligible cost of voting.
23Specifically, on average, 27.9% of the votes were wasted (cast for the losing candidate),
44% were surplus (cast for the winning candidate but not necessary to win the local race),
and only 28.1% were eﬀective (needed to win the election).
24Explicitly, competitiveness in district , state , is measure by
1− |%    −%    | 
Thus a value of 1 represents a perfect parity between the two positions and as the index
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Figure 3: Change in Turnout, Secession and 1860 Presidential Election
Notes: The dependent variable in model is the district-level change in
voter participation between i) the elections for convention delegates (left
panel), or, ii) the secession referenda (right panel) and the 1860 Presiden-
tial election. The main explanatory variable is: 1-–(margin of victory)–
(in each respective election). Each model controls for slaveholders share,
the eﬀective number of parties in the presidential election, and includes
state fixed eﬀects.
county we are able to control for many unobserved factors that may aﬀect turnout. We
partial out as well the impact of prior competitiveness by controlling for the Laakso and
Taagepera (1979) eﬀective number of parties index in the presidential election. In addition,
we include a set of demographics which could condition both participation and competi-
tiveness (e.g., the number of slaveholders in the electorate and the total population) and
to control for unobserved state-level factors we include state fixed eﬀects.25
This figure indicates a strong positive and highly significant correlation between district
approaches 0 the district becomes less competitive.
25Expectations about the overall support for the movement in the state may have neg-
atively influenced the participation locally. For instance, a member of the SC Legislature
argued that turnout was low among Unionist in low-slave dependent regions because “The
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competitiveness and change in turnout. The slope coeﬃcient of 0.55 (S.E. = 0.046) implies
that a one-standard-deviation increase in the competitiveness of a district is associated with
an increase in participation of 17.5 percentage points between these elections. Compared to
the mean decline in turnout (33%) the magnitude of this increase is very substantial. This
relationship is not driven by any particular outlier, in fact once we identify and exclude
outliers the positive slope is more precisely estimated (see Figure OA3).
Further evidence that these plurality districts conditioned voter behavior comes from the
Upper South states that held (pre-War) referendums on questions pertaining to secession.
In NC for instance, where voters were asked whether or not they wanted their state to hold
a secession convention, turnout declined by only 3% compared to the 1860 presidential
election. Similarly, in VA voters were asked whether a secession decision by the proposed
convention should only go into eﬀect if ratified subsequently by a popular vote, county
turnout fell on average 2.3 percentage points. Overall, the average decline in turnout in the
referenda for which data is available (NC, TN, and VA) was below 5%. This key diﬀerence
in participation between these referendums and the election of convention delegates in the
Lower South is shown in the right panel, Figure 3. As can be seen, the relationship between
the closeness of the local result and the change in turnout is insignificant. This makes sense
as votes for a losing candidate count for nothing, while every vote in a referendum adds to
the aggregate state tally.
4.3 Candidate Entry
An additional electoral factor associated with the low turnout in the elections of delegates
is the high number of districts with candidates running unopposed. This potentially had a
negative impact on participation as the strategic choice by candidates of whether or not to
run should aﬀect the number of votes cast, as the opposition voters have no representatives
to vote for. Overall, around 10 percent of the seats in these conventions were elected from
uncontested districts which contained 9% of the AWM in these states. This is particularly
relevant for districts won by secessionist candidates as approximately 12.5% of them were
uncontested (these districts contained 7.4% of the AWM population of these states). By
Union men thought it was a foregone conclusion that the State would secede, & it was not
worth their while to go to the polls (as quoted in Sinha (2003: 242).”
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comparison, approximately 5.7% of the districts won by cooperationists were uncontested
(these districts contained only 1.4% of the AWM of these states).
4.4 Did Abstainers Opposed Secession?
Our evidence suggests that if the Lower South states would have allowed referendum proce-
dures, overall turnout would have increased and perhaps even a majority would have voted
against secession. This counterfactual is consistent with a historical literature on the crisis
downplaying the popularity of the movement and arguing that only a minority in each state
supported it (e.g., Potter 1942; Escott 1992; Freehling 2007). As Potter (1942, 208) claims,
“At no time during the winter of 1860-1861 was secession desired by a majority of people
in the slave states...Furthermore, secession was not basically desired even by a majority in
the lower South.”
Although we lack the evidence necessary to systematically investigate these arguments,
many works provide suggestive evidence that abstainers tended to oppose secession and
were intimidated by secessionists, especially in the slave-intensive counties (e.g., Barney
2011; Sinha 2003; Williams 2008). For instance, a cooperationist in MS said “I knew
many who were in favor of the Union, who were intimidated by threats, and by the odium
attending it, from voting at all” (as cited in Barney 1974, 269).26 For these reasons some
historians have claimed that the elected pro-secession majorities in the Lower South states
reflected substantial voter fraud and intimidation (e.g., McCurry 2010).
The argument that abstention was systematically influenced by coercion fits broadly
with the more conventional view that the slaveholding elite used “the traditional powers of
their planter oligarchy” to overcome the will of the non-slaveholding majority during the
crisis (Donnelly 1965, 81).27 Yet, the use of voter suppression is largely complementary
26Similarly, a cooperationist in Texas wrote that secession was achieved by the “reign
of terror of a “ferocious minority...I only dared protest as strongly and I thought pru-
dent. . . accordingly I did not vote” (as cited in Freehling 2007, 459)
27As Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue, this traditional (de facto) power of slave-
holders could be explained not only by their control over the economic system but also by
their greater education and ability to act collectively.
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to our institutional argument. While these tactics may have helped slaveholders to obtain
pluralities in the high-slave districts, it would have been much more costly, if not impossible,
to employ in the low-slave districts.28 Moreover, since secessionists only needed to win
pluralities in districts comprising a majority of delegates, the geographic scale of where
they may have needed to employ these tactics was significantly reduced. That is, the
conventions localized political competition and significantly lowered the share of (swing)
voters secessionists needed to intimidate in order to obtain a majority of delegates.
5 Representation in the Conventions
In this section we analyze the voting behavior of delegates in the conventions. Since the
final choice on secession was transferred from the voters to representatives, a relevant ques-
tion is whether delegates eﬀectively represented the economic interests of their constituents.
In particular, delegates could have been more responsive to the interest of large slavehold-
ers implying an additional source of distortion. Although some historical accounts have
discussed the relationship between slavery and the secession ordinances (notably Wooster
1962), no previous work, to our knowledge, has systematically explored the voting be-
havior of delegates or tested whether they faithfully represented the economic interests of
constituencies. We explore this using a comprehensive list of votes in various conventions
and test whether the delegate-level support for the movement was divided across the slave
ownership structure of constituencies. Overall, we find that delegates were responsive to
both high and low slave-dependent constituencies.
5.1 Data
Using the oﬃcial journal of each convention, we coded all roll-calls where we could infer the
revealed position on secession and match each delegate to their constituency. We restrict
the analysis to votes that occurred prior to the firing on Fort Sumter (April 15, 1861),
since as mentioned, the costs and benefits of secession were altered significantly by the
28As the relatively high turnout and lopsided victories in favor of cooperationists indicate,
these tactics were either not used or were ineﬀective in the low-slave districts.
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onset of hostilities.29 Ten states held a convention prior to April 15, 1861. From these,
seven records were available and suitable for our analysis: five Lower South states which
seceded unilaterally in their convention (FL, AL, GA, MS, and LA), and two Upper South
states (AR and VA) in which a majority of delegates rejected such motion.30 Hence our
analysis comprises seven independent legislative bodies. In total, we coded 27 motions
and resolutions involving 920 delegates and 3,213 individual votes. The precise resolutions,
their description, and the final vote tally in each is presented in the Data Appendix.
Each coding includes the vote on the final ordinance.31 While pre-ordinance motions
were not identical across states, in the Lower South conventions the substance and sequence
of the votes is similar. The first entailed a motion on whether the state had the right or
an obligation to secede given the threat of Lincoln’s election. Cooperationists would then
oﬀer an alternative to either delay the vote or to organize a Southern-wide convention to
bargain with the North as a unified regional bloc. When this alternative was voted down,
cooperationists would then put forth a resolution that the convention’s decision should not
take eﬀect until ratified by the people. Additional votes before the final ordinance include
other motions such that the convention’s decision would not go into eﬀect until a stipulated
number of neighboring states also seceded. In all cases, we were able to identify at least
two roll calls that grouped delegates into clear pro- and anti-secession camps.32
Our main explanatory variable is the slave share in each electoral constituency. As
explained, this measure captures the direct economic interest of slaveholders and the pos-
29This means that, for instance, we analyze the vote on secession of the Virginia con-
vention held on April 4th, but do not include the subsequent votes in the same convention
held on April 17th.
30In the SC convention there was only one roll call (not recorded) before the final vote
on secession. The secession ordinance was passed with unanimous support. We cannot
include MO for the opposite reason (i.e., secession was nearly unanimously rejected). We
exclude TX for reasons discussed in footnote 8.
31Specifically, the last vote we coded was the final vote on secession.
32In the Upper South conventions, fewer pre-final votes took place since a majority used
procedural methods to prevent secession resolutions from reaching the floor.
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sible indirect interests of non-slaveholders. Yet, slave incidence is potentially correlated
with many local features which could have directly altered the cost and benefits of seces-
sion. Hence, we control for a number of economic factors such the level of non-agricultural
wealth which we proxy by using population density in 1860. Similarly, local commercial
connections and access to markets could have shaped the willingness to secede (Noe 1994),
which we control for by calculating the railway coverage circa 1860 (normalized by county
area). We created this measure using the GIS data on historical railway lines from the
University of Nebraska’s Center for Digital Research in the Humanities. Slave prevalence is
also commonly associated with wealth inequalities thus our slave measure could pick up the
eﬀect of local inequality leading to an omitted variable bias. To address this, in all models
we control for land inequality using a Gini index similar to the one employed by Nunn
(2008). All models also include the (log) size in square km and the (log) total population
of the district as independent controls to account for scale eﬀects.
We control for some delegate-specific characteristics that may have influenced their po-
sition on secession and override the importance of their constituents’ interests. Primarily,
a delegate’s personal economic interest in slavery may crucially influence his vote. To al-
low for this possibility, we control for the number of slaves each delegate owned in 1860.
Our main source for this measure is the Slave Schedule of the Census, which lists slave-
holdings by private individuals. Each record was located manually using Ancestry.com,
which allowed us to identify the information using the name of each delegate. Ideally,
we would control for the ideology and party aﬃliation of delegates as well. For instance,
we would like to estimate and control for an ideological score based on previous voting
records. Unfortunately, systematic information on the party aﬃliation of representatives
is not available, nor do we have previous voting records in other legislatures. Our second
best strategy is to complement delegates’ slaveholdings with other personal characteristics
using the biographical information collected by Wooster (1951; 1954; 1956; 1958). This in-
formation includes the age, occupation, birth place, the value of real property of delegates,
it is available for 4 of the 7 conventions analyzed. Summary statistics of all the variables
are presented in our Online Appendix.
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5.2 Results
We investigate the statistical relationship between the delegate-level support for secession
and the slave dependence of their constituents using a series of logit models where the
dependent variable is an indicator for either a “yea (1)” or a “nay (0)” on each motion (yea
represents a pro-secession position).33 In addition to the characteristics described above,
we include a full set of motion fixed eﬀects. In all models, standard errors are clustered at
the delegate level and robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.34
Figure 4 summarizes our estimates. We plot the corresponding marginal eﬀect, and
its 95% confidence interval, of district slave share on the likelihood of a pro-secession vote
in each convention (Table A2 shows the corresponding regression output).35 All models
include the same set of controls. The estimate on slave share for all conventions is posi-
tive and highly statistically significant. The magnitude of these eﬀects is also large. For
instance, the estimated eﬀect for FL implies that a delegate from a county one standard
deviation above the mean slave share is expected to have around 0.22 more chance of
voting for secession than a delegate from the “average county” of this state. The point
estimates for the other Lower South states (MS, LA, AL, and GA), are remarkably similar
and precisely estimated. These indicate an elasticity of support for secession with respect
33This model can be interpreted as an approximation of a general latent utility model of
the form
∗ () = w +  for  ∈ {0 1}
 = 1 {∗ (1)  ∗ (0)} 
where {w } is a set of covariates and {e } a set of errors such that 1 − 0 |(w1 w0 ) ∼  .
The pdf of  is continuous and symmetric around zero.
34Hence, our inferences are robust to any form of serial correlation arising from time-
invariant characteristics not included such as ideology or racial prejudice.
35Given the small number of motions available and the lack of “bridge” legislative bodies,
we do not estimate a pooled model using all the conventions.
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to constituency slave share of approximately 1.36
Figure 4: The Eﬀect of Local Slave Incidence on Secession Votes
Notes: Each dot corresponds to the marginal eﬀect of 1860 slave share
in a logit model predicting the delegate-level likelihood of casting a pro-
secession vote. Horizontal lines are 95
The results for the two Upper South conventions (AR and VA) are very similar. The
marginal eﬀect estimate of 1.78 (S.E.=0.65) for AR implies that a representative from a
county having a slave share one standard deviation above the state mean is approximately
29% more likely to cast a pro-secession vote. For such a delegate in the VA convention,
the magnitude of this eﬀect is 39%. These estimates suggest that the behavior of delegates
was similar across states and that the positive influence of slave labor dependence was not
particular to the Lower South, although as we know, state-level prevalence of slavery was
significantly lower in the Upper South region.
To provide a more illustrative idea of the magnitude of these eﬀects, we present the
predicted probabilities of the observed pro-secession votes across the within-sample vari-
36An elasticity of 1 in this setting is not economically meaningful but serves as a bench-
mark across states. The logit marginal eﬀects are: 0.8 (S.E. = 0.3) for MS, 1.05 (S.E.=0.3)
for LA, 1.2 (S.E.=0.3) for AL, and 1.3 (S.E.=0.2) for GA.
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ation on district slave share for each convention in Figure 5. In all models we hold all
the other explanatory variables at their local mean. The monotonic and positive eﬀect of
slave incidence on the likelihood of delegate support is clear in all the conventions. For
instance, a delegate representing a district in the bottom 25th percentile of the slave share
distribution in GA has an (average) predicted probability of 29% of casting a pro-secession
vote. This probability rises to 85% for a delegate representing a district in the top 25th
percentile. The predictions for the voting behavior of delegates in the two Upper South
conventions are remarkably similar (e.g., a delegate in AR coming from a district in the
bottom 25th percentile votes aﬃrmatively with a probability of 24% while one representing
a district in the top 25th does so with a probability of 87%).
Figure 5: Predicted Probability of Casting a pro-Secession Vote
5.3 Robustness
In our Online Appendix we explore the robustness of our estimates. First, while the vote
on the final ordinance tended to be lopsided, pre-ordinance votes were generally closely
contested. With the exception of MS, the average support for the pre-ordinance motions
indicate that much smaller majorities in AL (54%), GA (55%), FL (58%), and LA (68%)
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favored secession.37 This suggest that the final votes contained a significant degree of strate-
gic behavior by delegates.38 To account for this, we perform a sensitivity analysis excluding
the final vote from the sample in each convention. As expected, the estimated eﬀects of
slave share excluding the final vote is generally bigger and more precisely estimated. In
addition, we run our models taking only the final vote roll-calls and find that the eﬀect
is smaller, more noisy, and for some conventions is not even statistically significant (Table
OA4). Second, we augment the set of controls to account for additional economic, political,
and cultural factors which could be associated with slavery. For example, we control for
other potentially relevant economic characteristics, such as the size of the manufacturing
sector, which could be negatively correlated with slavery and alter the benefits of sepa-
ration. Lastly, we use the number of slaveholders (as % of the AWM population) as an
alternative explanatory variable. Overall, the association between local slave incidence and
support for immediate secession in these conventions is robust to the inclusion of additional
controls and to these other specifications (Tables OA5-6).
6 The Persistence of Southern Malapportionment
As explained above, the system of representation used in all conventions closely mirrored
the existing system to select state legislators. Thus, the electoral constituencies we have
studied so far were not created during the crisis. Yet, the legislative representation in 1860
could reflect, however implausible, a successful attempt by secessionists to manipulate state
37These figures represent the average share of delegates making a pro-secession vote
across all pre-ordinance roll-calls.
38The leader of the cooperationists in the AL convention, Jeremiah Clemens, articulated
this strategic behavior in a speech prior to the final vote: “I believe your Ordinance to be
wrong–if I could defeat it I would; but I know I cannot. It will pass, and, when passed,
it becomes the act of the State of Alabama...[A]lthough as a member of this convention
I opposed your Ordinance...my name shall stand upon the original vote, and side by side
with you I brave the consequences. I vote in the aﬃrmative. (as cited in the New York
Times, January 28, 1861).”
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institutions anticipating the sectional crisis. We now investigate some historical correlates
to demonstrate this is highly unlikely. First, we show that the legislative malapportionment
of the seceding states can be traced back to the late 18th century and persisted throughout
the first half of the 19th century. Second, we show how the early concentration of slave labor
is associated with the initial patterns of legislative representation in these states. Therefore,
the overrepresentation of slave districts in the early 1860s was unlikely associated with any
long-standing preference for secession or with any possible political manipulation in the
midst of the crisis.
In Table 2 we present the relationship between legislative representation and a number
of historical variables. Legislative representation is measured the same way we measured
the relative representation of districts in the secession conventions.39 Since states entered
the Union at diﬀerent times, each model varies in the number of states included. All
models include state fixed eﬀects and controls for the previously used district-level factors
that might be correlated with state-level representation (e.g., total population, share of
urban population, and foreign-born white population in 1860, respectively).
[Table 2 about here]
Column (1) shows the simple bivariate relationship between the representation of dis-
tricts in the convention and their corresponding legislative representation in 1860. The
nearly perfect correlation indicates that the electoral system of the legislatures was indeed
used in the conventions. In next columns we then predict the 1860 legislative represen-
tation using the exact same measure in 1830.40 This model reveals a positive and highly
significant association which demonstrates that counties that were overrepresented in 1860
were similarly overrepresented thirty years earlier. The fit of this model (2 = 048) also
indicates the high degree of persistence in these electoral systems. These results are nearly
39Namely, we identify the statutes or provisions specifying the apportionment of each
legislature for each decade year between 1790 and 1860. As each state legislature was
bicameral, we follow Ansolabehere, Gerber and Snyder (2002) and take the average across
chambers.
40Due to their later admission, FL and TX are not included in this sample.
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identical when we restrict the sample to the Lower South states that lead the secession
movement (column 3). We then explain the 1840 representation with the “initial represen-
tation” corresponding to the apportionment stipulated in each state’s initial constitution.41
As seen, districts that were originally overrepresented in the late 18th century and early
19th century were still significantly overrepresented in the 1830s (columns 4 and 5).
In the last two columns we explore the relationship between the initial level of represen-
tation and early patterns of slave labor concentration. First, we estimate a model taking
the district-level slave share in 1790, the first census-year following independence (column
6). The coeﬃcient of 1.94 (S.E. = 0.17) on this variable indicates that each percentage
point increase in a district’s slave share was associated with a nearly 2% increase in the
initial . This implies that a district having half of its population enslaved in 1790
(approximately one standard deviation above the mean district) is predicted to have an
initial  0.36 log points above that of the average district. Second, the 1790 Census
provides the number of slaveholding households, which we use to calculate the share of
households who do not own slaves. Column 6 shows that this alternative measure of slave
prevalence is strongly and inversely correlated with the initial overrepresention validating
our previous result.
Unfortunately, we cannot investigate whether the spatial distribution of non-slaveholders
and slaveholders was similarly biased over time. The Census only collected data on slave
ownership in 1790 and 1860, and in the seceding states, the 1790 records are only available
for NC and SC. The existing data for these states indicates that the bias in favor of slave
districts was present from the nation’s founding. In each state, the share of the state’s
AWM who were slaveholders was approximately 27%. Yet, half of SC’s non-slaveholders
resided in districts comprising 19% of the state’s house seats and 22% of the state’s senate
seats. In these counties, the non-slaveholder to slaveholder ratio was approximately 4. In
the remaining counties, which comprised roughly 80% of the SC’s legislative seats, slave-
holders were concentrated such that this ratio was approximately 1. Slaveholders in NC
were similarly distributed such that they were concentrated in counties which comprised a
large majority of the legislative seats.
41For GA, NC, SC, and VA we proxy the initial apportionment using the 1790 appor-
tionment. For TN we use 1800 and for AL, LA, and MS we use the 1820 values.
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7 Why Conventions?
The evidence presented thus far indicates that the conventions were advantageous to slave-
holders and were an important component of the strategy for achieving secession. Given
that the electoral system employed to select delegates used the existing legislative districts
and apportionment, the anticipated eﬀect of this mechanism was surely evident and should
have therefore been opposed by anti-secessionist members of the each state’s legislature.42
If the passage and implementation of these conventions implies that a majority of legislators
in each state was in favor of secession, why was it not voted upon directly in the various
legislatures? We argue that secessionists saw the conventions as an important process
for legitimizing this highly consequential choice, but without the risks associated with a
statewide referendum. We use the national debates regarding the admission of Kansas as a
slave state to briefly demonstrate that the use of conventions to bypass majority opposition
had a distinct tradition in the South.
Holding elections for convention delegates entailed electoral risks, and many secessionists
demanded to vote expediently on this in the state legislatures.43 Yet, many also questioned
the legitimacy and consequences of doing so, as this would violate a long-held norm regard-
ing the fundamental distinction between constitutional and statutory law (e.g., Dodd 1910;
Green 1930). As Tarr (2000, 69) explains, “The notion that a legislature, even if a ‘full
and free representation of the people’, might lack suﬃcient authority to act for the peo-
ple reflected a recognition, present from the outset, that [state] constitutions diﬀered from
ordinary statutes and that greater popular input and control were required for their adop-
tion.” Alexander Stephens, future Vice-President of the Confederacy, invoked this norm in
42Indeed, as we described above, state legislators opposed to secession vigorously fought
against the creation of these conventions (e.g., Crofts 1989; Harris 1988; Johnson 1977;
Wooster 1962).
43This concern was expressed in a letter from a SC legislator to Congressman M.L.
Bonham: “many...are in favor of declaring SC out of the Union, by enacting a law to that
eﬀect. They know that if the people should decide against them, it will be decisive against
separate state action for all time to come” (Bonham Papers, SCL).
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a speech to the GA legislature in November of 1860, when he said, “the Legislature is not
the proper body to sever our Federal Relations....Sovereignty is not in the Legislature (as
cited in Freehling and Simpson 1992).”
While the use of conventions for constitutional reforms was institutionalized across
all states, the Southern states deviated from Northern states in terms of not requiring a
posterior ratification by voters (Tarr 2000). Instead, these states developed a norm which
Freehling (2007, 133) describes as the “Southern gospel of a state convention’s absolute
sovereignty.” Thus, when Stephens in the same speech admonished the GA legislature, “you
have no power to act, and must refer this question to the people....We, the people are the
sovereigns”, he argued for the necessity of receiving popular consent for such a consequential
decision. Yet, his concept of “the people” did not conform to an exercise of direct democracy
but to this Southern norm of representative democracy. As he explained, “[I] know of no
way to decide great questions aﬀecting fundamental laws except by representatives of the
people.”
An example of the strategic use of this tradition was revealed in the debates regarding
that admission of Kansas to the Union in 1857 and 1858. This episode is particularly inter-
esting because it shows how a convention was previously used to bypass perceived majority
opposition to bringing a slave state into the Union. A sectional conflict occurred when a
convention in Kansas requested admission to the Union without submitting the proposed
constitution to the territory’s voters for ratification.44 When the Presidentially-appointed
territorial governor opposed the admission, MS Congressman, prominent jurist, and future
delegate to the MS secession convention, Lucius Lamar, wrote to the US Secretary of the
Treasury Howell Cobb that it was a “shameless abandonment of our right...[to] oppose the
admission of a slave state, merely because her constitution was not submitted to the peo-
ple” (Cobb Letters, LC). On the question of the “propriety of submitting the constitution
for ratification”, Alexander Stephens similarly wrote to Cobb that, “I have nothing to say,
because...it is the right of the convention to do it or not, as they please (Stephens Letters,
LC).” Cobb, a future secessionist and the first President of the Provisional Confederate
44Specifically, the convention determined that slaves already brought into the territory
were permitted to remain as slaves, and this decision was not submitted for voter ratification
(Freehling 2007: 134).
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Congress, responded to Stephens that “refusing to submit the constitution to the people
for ratification...will produce the most dangerous crisis we have yet had on the Kansas
question. The reply can be made with overwhelming power that the refusal to submit was
the result alone of a fear that a majority would condemn it” (Cobb Letters, LC).
The ensuing debates in Congress on the Kansas issue in early 1858 revealed the divide
between free and slave states on the unlimited powers of conventions. In a speech to the
US Senate, New York (NY) Senator, Preston King, claimed that if Kansas were admitted,
then “the sovereign right of the people is denied, and the sovereign right of a convention
is aﬃrmed...[The question] is no less vital to the people of every State now in the Union,
because it is the question where sovereignty resides, whether in representative bodies, or
in the people.” Stephen Mallory, senator from FL, challenged King’s premise by arguing
that the free states’ objections “could be summed up in this: the constitution framed at
Lecompton was not submitted to the vote of the people, and it does not reflect the will of
the people of Kansas. Let me ask, sir, who are the people of Kansas? The senator from
NY says that the people means the majority. I deny any such doctrine.” In his famous
“Cotton is King” speech to the Senate in March, 1858, SC Senator James Hammond began
by stating that the free states would admit Kansas if “this constitution embodied the will
of the people of Kansas...the only question is, how that will is to be ascertained, and upon
that point, we diﬀer. In my opinion the will of the people of Kansas is to be sought in the
act of her lawful convention elected to form a constitution, and no where else.”
We therefore interpret the creation of the secession conventions as a calculated risk nec-
essary to legitimize the movement. Why would secessionists care about the perceived legit-
imacy of the mechanism implemented? Of particular relevance, legitimacy has been found
to increase support for war (Levi 1997) and lower the need to use coercive measures (Tyler
2006). Secession would likely lead to conflict, and the mobilization of non-slaveholders
would be critical to the South’s prospects for independence. In the same speech, Stephens
articulated this logic: “The greatest curse that can befall a free people is civil war. Let all
these matters be submitted to a convention of the people, and when the will of the majority
of the people has thus been expressed, the whole State will present one unanimous voice
in favor of whatever may be demanded.”
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8 Conclusion
In this study, we investigate how elites exploited Southern representative institutions to
allow a small minority to choose secession for their states. Specifically, we argue that the
choice of state legislatures in the Lower South to use conventions instead of referenda was
strategically chosen to bypass perceived opposition to the secession movement of 1860. Our
results indicate that the geographic intensity of slavery was related to significant distortions
to representation that greatly magnified the electoral power of high slave-intensity regions.
Our argument, of course, does not preclude the possibility that conflict over slavery
would have occurred regardless of Lincoln’s election. Economic historians have shown that
slavery was thriving and there were no signs of an impending economically-determined
demise (Fogel 1994). Slaveholders’ concerns would only grow more acute with the ability
of an anti-slavery administration to use federal patronage to build a Republican Party in the
South (Freehling 2007). This suggests that slaveholders harbored significant suspicions of
the Southern non-slaveholding majority’s commitment to protect slavery and may indicate
that conflict was unavoidable.
There was also open talks of irregular measures to overthrow the state governments
if secession was thwarted politically. The extra-legal convention held in TX is a notable
example. Despite these possible de facto mechanisms, there is substantial evidence that
secessionists believed it was important to secede by legal means. As we have argued, they
tried to legitimize their cause using an established legal norm. Coups and other non-
democratic methods would have therefore hurt the cause of mobilizing support, especially
among the nonslaveholding majority.
Yet, the choice to not risk rejection in a referendum may have ultimately undermined se-
cessionists’ goal. For instance, Olken (2010) demonstrated that direct democracy increases
the legitimacy of public decisions, even if they were the same as made by representative
democracy. This is relevant to the outcome of the Civil War since scholars have questioned
why an area the size of the South was overwhelmed in such a short period of time (e.g.,
Bearman 1991). Many historians have argued that internal dissension, in particular, class
conflicts, contributed more to its collapse than military defeat by a superior adversary
(Beringer et al. 1986; Escott 1978; Freehling 2001; Williams 2008). This dissension is
demonstrated by the fact that more than 10% of the soldiers from the Confederate states
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fought for the Union and desertion became an increasing problem as the war dragged on
(Freehling 2001). Beringer et al. (1986) observed that, “After three years of essentially
successful defense against powerful invading forces these prolonged strains proved more
than Confederate nationalism could bear. . . Confederates by thousands of individual deci-
sions, abandoned the struggle for and allegiance to the Confederate States of America.”
This weakness was particularly pronounced in the low slave regions. Bearman (1991), for
instance, found that in NC, soldiers from the persistently underrepresented ‘uphill’ regions
were nine times as likely to desert as those from the heavily enslaved piedmont, even when
controlling for slaveholdings and wealth of the soldiers. The representative institutions of
the South allowed slaveholders to dominate politics but could not force the yeoman to fight
indefinitely for their dream of an independent slave republic.
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Table 1 
  Spatial Distribution of Slave Ownership, 1860 
Non-Slaveholders % of State % Convention Non-Slaveholders % of State
to Slaveholders Slaveholders Delegates  to Slaveholders AWM
All Low Slave High Slave High Slave High Slave Minimal Minimal 
Districts Share Share Share Share Winning Winning
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Alabama 2.5 5.7 1.6 77.6 64 1.3 43.7
Florida 2.6 4.6 1.9 74.5 61.6 1.5 47.1
Georgia 2.2 5.2 1.4 78.1 62.1 1.2 42.6
Louisiana 3.5 11.6 2.1 85.3 84.3 1.1 27.8
Mississippi 1.7 2.9 1.2 70.6 60.2 1.1 45.9
South Carolina 1.5 2.5 1.2 73.1 74.7 1.0 44.8
All 2.3 5.1 1.4 78.2 67.2 1.2 41.3
Districts 375 141 234 234 234 174 174
Notes: the ratio of non-slaveholders to slaveholders (columns 1-3, 6), the share of slaveholders (column 4), and the share of AWM 
(column 7) is calculated from the 1860 Census. The set of “Minimum winning” districts (columns 6-7) is based on a simple majority 
of delegates in each convention sorting counties from highest to lowest slave share.   
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Table 2 
Persistence and Determinants of Southern Political Inequality 
Convention  Legislative RRI   Legislative RRI  Initial Legislative
Dependent Variable: RRI 1860  1830 RRI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Legislative RRI, 1860 0.98***
(0.02)
Legislative RRI, 1830 0.54*** 0.57***
(0.05) (0.06)
Initial Legislative RRI 0.37*** 0.51***
(0.05) (0.08)
Slave Share, 1790 1.98***
(0.17)
% Non-Slaveholding -1.43***
Households, 1790 (0.37)
R
2
0.83 0.48 0.61 0.44 0.61 0.83 0.51
 Districts 770 424 195 238 92 180 86
 Sample Confederate Confederate Lower Confederate Lower Original Original 
States States South States South States States
Notes: Each column reports an OLS estimate (robust standard errors in parenthesis). In models (1)-(3) we control for log total 
population, urbanization rate, and foreign-born population share, all from 1860. Models (4)-(7) control for the log total population 
in the respective decade. All models include state fixed effects. Confederate states: AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TX, and 
VA. Lower South states: AL, GA, LA, MS, and SC. Original states: GA, NC, SC, and VA.  
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Data Appendix  
Table DA1. District-level Variables and Sources 
Variable  Description Source
Relative Representation 
Index (RRI )
Representation of individuals in the conventions and in the 
state legislatures. See text for details. 
Created by authors using the US 
Census, state constitutions, and statutes 
on apportionment (various years).
Slave Share Number of slaves in a district as a proportion of total 
population.
US Census (various years.)
Slaveholders Share Number of slaveholders in the district as a proportion of 
the adult white male (AWM) population.
US Census (1860)
Slaveholding Inequality Gini coefficient of slave ownership.  We aggregate the 
slaveholdings categories of the Census into: i) 1 to 9, ii) 10 
to 19, iii) 20 to 49, iv) 50 to 99, v) 100 to 499, vi) 500 or 
more slaves, and use the median value in each to estimate 
the total number of slaves correspondingly.
US Census (1860)
Planters Share Number of AWM in the district owning 20 or more slaves, 
as a proportion of the AWM population. 
US Census (1860)
Population Density District population over size (in sq.mi.). Atlas of Historical County Boundaries, 
Newberry Library (various years). 
Railway Coverage, 1860 Railroad milage over district size (in sq.mi.). Center for Digital Research in the 
Humanities, University of Nebraska
Land Inequality Gini coefficient of land ownership.  We aggregate the farm 
acreage categories of the Census into : i) 3 to 9, ii) 10 to 
19, iii) 20 to 49, iv) 50 to 99, v) 100 to 499, vi) 500-999, 
and vii) more than 1000 acres, and use the median acreage 
in each to estimate the total number of farms 
correspondingly.
US Census (1860)
US Census slave schedules in 1860 as 
provided by Ancestry.com.
Delegate's Slaveholdings Number of slaves owned by delegates to the conventions of
AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, VA. 
Delegate Characteristics Birth place, age, occupation, and real and personal 
property of delegates to the conventions of AR, FL, GA 
and LA, as collected by Wooster. 
Wooster (1951, 1954, 1956, 1958)
Political Competition in 
1860
Effective Number of parties in the 1860 Presidential 
Election.
Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (2006)
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Table DA2. District-level Electoral Returns and Sources 
State  Vote Description
Date of 
Election
Source
MS Elections for delegates to the 
convention
Dec. 20, 1860 Rainwater (1938)
AL Elections for delegates to the 
convention
Dec. 24, 1860 Denman (1933)
GA Elections for delegates to the 
convention
Jan. 2, 1861 Johnson (1972)
LA Elections for delegates to the 
convention
Jan. 7, 1861 Dew (1970)
VA Referendum of whether a 
convention decision to secede 
requires voter ratification
Feb. 4, 1861 Journal of the Acts and 
Proceedings of a General 
Convention of the State of 
Virginia, Doc. IX  (Richmond: 
Wyatt M. Elliot, 1861)
TN Referendum on whether the state 
should call a secession convention
Feb. 9, 1861 Tennessee State Library and 
Archives – Record Group #87
NC Referendum on whether the state 
should call a secession convention
Feb. 28, 1861 State Archives of North 
Carolina. Election Returns on 
Constitutional Questions, 1861 
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Table DA3. Convention Roll-Calls Description 
Alabama
 Vote Description yeas/nays
1. Convention President (p. 5) 53/45
2. State troops transferred to FL to seize Federal forts (p. 27) 53/45
3. Minority Report offering Southern Convention to redress grievances (p. 40) 54/48
4. Ordinance shall not go into effect until the 4th day of March, 1861, and not then unless the same 54/44
shall have been ratified and confirmed by a direct vote of the people (p. 41)
5. Report of the majority and the Ordinance of Secession, as amended (p. 44) 61/39
Florida
 Vote Description yeas/nays
1. Allison Amdt to McIntosh Rs: If GA and AL do not secede, then FL only secedes if 42/27
it is submitted to the people (p. 28)
2. Ward Amdt. Secession should not take place until FL knows what GA and AL do (p. 29) 39/30
3. Ordinance does not take effect until ratified by voters (p. 29) 41/26
4. Morton Rs: Vote on Secession Should wait for the official AL decision (p. 30) 41/28
5. Vote on Secession Should wait until January 18 (p. 30) 40/29
6. Ordinance of Secession (p. 32) 62/7
Georgia
 Vote Description yeas/nays
1. Nisbet Rs: It is the right and duty of GA to secede from the Union and form a Southern 166/130
Confederacy (p. 20)
2. Hill Motion: replace secession ordinance with Johnson Resolution-Cooperation resolution 164/133
of Southern Convention and other demands (p. 32)
3. Ordinance of Secession (p. 35) 208/89
Louisiana
 Vote Description yeas/nays
1. Rozier Rs: Cooperation resolution-Southern Convention and other demands (p. 15) 106/27
2. Fuqua Rs: If North tries to coerce any state that seceded back into the Union, then 73/47
LA will defend the seceded states (p. 16)
3. Bienvenu Rs: Choice of Convention does not take effect until ratified by the voters (p. 17) 84/43
4. Ordinance of Secession (p. 18) 113/17
Mississippi
 Vote Description yeas/nays
1. Yerger Amendment: Southern convention and conditional Union (p. 14) 78/21
2. Alcorn Amendment: Ordinance does not go into effect until AL, GA, FL, and LA shall also 74/25
all secede (p. 14-15)
3. Brooke Amendment: Ordinance shall not take effect until ratified by the voters (p. 15) 74/25
4. Ordinance of Secession (p. 16) 84/15
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(cont.) 
Arkansas
 Vote Description yeas/nays
1. Hanly Amdt: Amdt to another resolution in which secession would take effect upon voter ratification (p. 82) 35/39
 2  Vote to postpone Yell Amdt: Vote to indefinitely postpone a vote on the following proposal: dissolve the 33/36
       Union in the Convention and then submit it to the people for ratification, and ordinance only goes into
       effect if ratified by the people (p. 82)
Virginia
 Vote Description yeas/nays
1. Convention President (p. 7-8) 54/70
2. Amdt on Secession (p. 136) 54/73
3. Harvie Amdt: Ordinance resuming the powers delegated by Virginia to the Federal Government (p. 136) 45/88
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Appendix Tables (supporting results)  
Table A1. Determinants of Political Inequality in the Conventions 
Dependent Variable:  (log) District RRI Secession Convention
Original 
Lower South States                Confederate States
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4)
Slave Share 1860 1.04*** 0.84*** 1.46*** 1.34***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
R
2 
[Obs] 0.26 [492] 0.31 [488] 0.59 [361] 0.60 [359]
Panel B (5) (6) (7) (8)
Slaveholders/AWM 1860 1.34*** 1.06*** 1.79*** 1.59***
(0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13)
R
2 
[Obs] 0.24 [492] 0.29 [488] 0.52 [361] 0.55 [359]
Controls no yes no yes
Notes: Each column presents a district-level OLS model with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. All models control for (log) total population and state fixed effects. Even 
numbered models control for urban population rate, foreign-born population share, and 
population density, all from the 1860 Census. *** p<0.01. 
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Table A2. Secession Roll-call Votes and Slave Incidence (Logit Estimates) 
Convention: FL MS LA AL GA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Slave Share 1860 9.05*** 7.56** 5.18*** 5.15** 7.26*** 6.91*** 6.53*** 5.69*** 5.39*** 5.82***
(2.96) (3.00) (1.94) (2.02) (1.70) (1.71) (1.60) (1.71) (0.88) (0.98)
p -R
2
0.161 0.185 0.102 0.102 0.250 0.252 0.372 0.383 0.167 0.172
 Delegates 67 67 96 96 128 128 100 100 295 295
 Observations 400 400 382 382 501 501 496 496 880 880
 County Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
 Delegate Slaveholdings no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
Convention: AR VA
(11) (12) (13) (14)
Slave Share 1860 10.46*** 7.14*** 6.70*** 8.19***
(2.40) (2.61) (1.09) (1.19)
p -R
2
0.361 0.401 0.316 0.336
 Delegates 74 74 144 143
 Observations 148 148 361 358
 County Controls yes yes yes yes
 Delegate Slaveholdings no yes no yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the delegate level in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. Dependent variable in all columns is the 
delegate-level likelihood of a pro-secession vote in the different conventions. County controls include: (log) total population, (log) area, 
population density, land inequity measured by a Gini index, and railway coverage circa 1860. Delegate slaveholdings refers to the exact number 
of slaves owned by each delegate according to the 1860 Slave Schedule, US Census. All models include a full set of motion fixed effects. See 
Data Appendix for detailed description of the motions used and sources. 
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